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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 
Meet the Constitution 
David S. Welkowitz* 
For many years, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has re-
fused to address constitutional claims raised in the course of registration 
or cancellation proceedings. A recent example involves the Washington 
Redskins trademark, which is the subject of a cancellation proceeding 
now before a U.S. Court of Appeals. The Board’s refusal to address con-
stitutional issues rests on the assumption that the Board lacks the au-
thority to make constitutional decisions. That may seem odd, given the 
fact that the Board is an arm of the federal government, and its members 
are bound to uphold the Constitution.  This Article examines the basis of 
the Board’s claim of incapacity. Although the Board’s claim is not with-
out precedent, it is argued that the better reading of current law is that 
the Board does have the capacity to address constitutional claims and 
that it should do so. The Article further examines ways in which the 
Board can decide constitutional issues without overstepping its bounds as 
an administrative agency. In particular, the Article examines the possi-
ble use of a familiar constitutional principle of avoidance as a means of 
allowing the Board to incorporate constitutional principles into its deci-
sion-making without having to rule on the constitutionality of the provi-
sions of the federal trademark statute. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Washington Redskins mark has been the subject of contro-
versy and cancellation proceedings for more than two decades.1 
Twice, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the “TTAB” or 
“Board”), an administrative tribunal within the United States Pa-
tent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), has canceled the mark’s 
registration on the grounds that it violated the prohibition on regis-
tering disparaging trademarks contained in the federal trademark 
law.2 Both times, the football team claimed that cancellation would 
                                                                                                                            
1 See Theresa Vargas, U.S. Patent Office Cancels Redskins Trademark Registration, Says 
Name Is Disparaging, WASH. POST (June 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/us-patent-office-cancels-redskins-trademark-registration-says-name-is-disparaging/ 
2014/06/18/e7737bb8-f6ee-11e3-8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
JNN3-HCXD]. 
2 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 
2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). The TTAB canceled the registration of Redskins, but a district 
court later reversed that decision. See id. The registration was again canceled in 
Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014), aff’d, 112 F. 
Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). The 
provision preventing the registration of disparaging marks is contained in section 2(a) of 
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violate its First Amendment rights.3 And, both times, the response 
from the TTAB—an arm of the government—was essentially the 
same: “Such a finding [of a First Amendment violation] is beyond 
the Board’s authority to make.”4 Regardless of the merits of the 
team’s First Amendment claims, the TTAB’s response—
essentially saying it is not capable of applying the U.S. Constitution 
to the issue of registration—is a strange one. 5 Moreover, it is one 
that the TTAB has given on several occasions, and not just in First 
Amendment situations.6 This Article contends that the TTAB, 
clearly a governmental actor,7 is incorrect to ignore constitutional 
restraints on government action. Even assuming that, as an admin-
istrative agency and not an Article III court, the Board cannot for-
mally declare a federal law unconstitutional, as an arm of the feder-
al government it is empowered to determine whether its actions 
comport with the Constitution, and it ought to do so. This Article 
                                                                                                                            
the Lanham Act (the federal trademark law), which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). 
The relevant portion of the statute states: 
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be 
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on 
the principal register on account of its nature unless it— 
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous 
matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with 
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring 
them into contempt, or disrepute . . . . 
§ 1052(a) (emphasis added). As discussed later, subsequent to the district court’s 
decision in Blackhorse, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the 
prohibition against disparaging marks in section 2(a) was unconstitutional on its face. In re 
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 
(2016). However, the appeal of Blackhorse will be decided by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, not the Federal Circuit. 
3 See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633, 1638 (T.T.A.B. 2011); 
Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1710. 
4 Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1832–33 (T.T.A.B. 1994). Here, the 
Board struck the football team’s First Amendment defenses from its answer, interpreting 
the First Amendment defense as a request to declare section 2(a) of the Lanham Act 
unconstitutional and beyond the Board’s authority. See id. A similar result occurred in 
Blackhorse. See 98 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638 (noting that the TTAB lacks authority to address 
facial and as-applied constitutional challenges). 
5 See Blackhorse, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638; Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1832–33. 
6 See infra Part I. 
7 See generally Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/trademark-trial-and-
appeal-board-ttab [https://perma.cc/RQQ2-JZN5] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016). 
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seeks to demonstrate why and how the TTAB should meet this 
commitment. Part I reviews cases in which the TTAB has refused 
to entertain constitutional arguments. Part II considers the authori-
ty of non-judicial governmental officials to apply the Constitution 
to their actions. Part III offers a framework in which the TTAB can 
entertain constitutional arguments without the need to declare laws 
unconstitutional. Part III relies partially on well-established norms 
of avoiding constitutional problems by preliminarily addressing 
them and then acting in a manner that avoids the potential consti-
tutional issue. 
It is important to note that it is not this Article’s purpose to re-
solve the underlying constitutional issues themselves—particularly 
the First Amendment issues.8 This Article’s goal is simply to dem-
onstrate that the TTAB ought to address them in registration pro-
ceedings, subject to proper review by the courts. 
I. THE TTAB’S REFUSAL TO ADDRESS CONSTITUTIONAL 
ISSUES 
In several recent cases, including Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.,9 
the TTAB has refused to consider the argument that the applica-
tion of the Lanham Act, in particular cases, would violate the Con-
stitution.10 The most notable of these cases involves First Amend-
ment challenges to the Lanham Act’s bar to registration on the 
grounds that the proposed mark is immoral, scandalous, or dispa-
raging.11 Thus, in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., the second case 
challenging the Redskins trademark, the Board struck down several 
affirmative defenses raising constitutional issues, stating: “Simply 
put the Board does not have the authority to determine constitu-
tional claims.”12 
                                                                                                                            
8 However, this Article offers some comments about those issues in passing. 
9 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
10 Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
11 Id. 
12 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633, 1638 (T.T.A.B. 2011). The Board specifically referenced both 
facial and as-applied challenges. Id. 
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Similarly, in the case In re Brunetti,13 where the TTAB refused 
the registration of the term “Fuct” under section 2(a) of the Lan-
ham Act on the grounds that it was scandalous or immoral, the 
Board rather forcefully refused to entertain a First Amendment 
argument: 
Finally, we readily recognize the statutory limita-
tions of this tribunal. It is abundantly clear that the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board is not the ap-
propriate forum for re-evaluating the impacts of any 
evolving First Amendment jurisprudence within Ar-
ticle III courts upon determinations under [s]ection 
2(a) of the Lanham Act, or for answering the Con-
stitutional arguments of legal commentators or blog 
critics.14 
The TTAB’s refusals to engage in constitutional applications 
are not limited to First Amendment claims. In the case In re The 
Government of the District of Columbia, the Board refused to rule on 
an argument that section 2(b) of the Lanham Act—which pre-
vented a city from registering its municipal seal as a trademark—
was a violation of equal protection.15 Additionally, in Zirco Corp. v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,16 the TTAB refused to enter-
tain an argument that applying the constructive use provision of 
                                                                                                                            
13 Brunetti, No. 85310960, 2014 WL 3976439, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2014). 
14 Id. at *5. The Brunetti case is currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit. As 
mentioned above, and discussed in more detail below, the Federal Circuit has already 
ruled that section 2(a) is unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits the registration of marks 
that may be disparaging. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub 
nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). The Justice Department, acting in conjunction 
with the USPTO, has notified the Federal Circuit in the Brunetti case that, despite 
disagreeing with the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, it would nevertheless make the section 
2(a) prohibition on registering scandalous or immoral marks—the basis for the refusal in 
Brunetti—unconstitutional as well. Letter Brief for U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office at 2, In re Brunetti, No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016) [hereinafter 
Letter Brief]. 
15 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1588, 1602 (T.T.A.B. 2012) (“[W]e cannot rule on applicant’s 
constitutional arguments.”). The TTAB did, however, respond to the merits in a 
footnote, citing Federal Circuit precedent. See id. at 1602 n.24. 
16 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542 (T.T.A.B. 1991). 
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the Lanham Act17 to an intent-to-use application prior to actual use 
and registration violates the Commerce Clause.18 Moreover, the 
Board does not distinguish between as-applied and facial constitu-
tional claims.19 In Harjo,  the football team argued  that it was not 
asking the Board to declare the statute unconstitutional, but only to 
apply it in a constitutional manner. However, the TTAB rejected 
this argument, largely reiterating its previous rationale.20 
On rare occasions, the Board will, in passing, address the Con-
stitution. In Research in Motion Limited v. Defining Presence Market-
ing Group, Inc., the applicant claimed that its proposed mark, 
Crackberry, was a parody of the Blackberry mark.21 The Board pe-
remptorily dismissed this argument: 
Furthermore, when federal courts are dealing with 
questions of alleged infringement, the protective 
penumbra of free speech may well support the pre-
                                                                                                                            
17 See Lanham Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2012). This provision deems the 
applicant’s first use, and thus its priority in the mark, to be the earlier of its first actual use 
or the date of the filing of the application to register. Id. Effectively, this means that 
someone applying before actual use (based on intent to use the mark) can claim priority 
dating back to its application filing date. However, the constructive use provision by its 
terms only applies if the applicant is successful in obtaining a registration, which requires 
actual use at some point. 
18 See Zirco Corp., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1544; cf. adidas AG v. Christian Faith Fellowship 
Church, No. 92053314, 2015 WL 5882313 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 14, 2015), rev’d, 841 F.3d 986 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). In a non-precedential case, the Board discussed case law relating to the 
constitutional standard of commerce and asserted that the applicant’s use “does not 
affect commerce that Congress can regulate such that the transaction would constitute 
use in commerce for purposes of registration.” adidas, 2015 WL 5882313, at *7. Although 
the case did not address a constitutional challenge to the legislation or its application, this 
case at least indirectly addresses constitutional issues by referring to the interpretation of 
the interstate commerce standard. See id. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the 
registrant’s activity was a “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act and reversed the 
Board’s cancellation of the mark. Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. adidas AG, 841 
F.3d 986, 990–95 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
19 See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1710 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 
284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
20 See id. at 1710 (“[W]e find such arguments unpersuasive, as the Board has no 
authority to determine, either generally or with respect to respondent, whether [s]ection 
2(a) is overbroad or vague, or to declare provisions of the Trademark Act 
unconstitutional.”). 
21 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1187, 1191 (T.T.A.B. 2012). Apparently, users of Blackberrys often 
were thought to be addicted to their devices, leading to widespread use of the term 
“Crackberry” for Blackberry devices. See id. 
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mise that members of the public have a right to use 
words in the English language to interest and amuse 
other persons. However, when this Board is asked 
the narrower question of applicants’ right to regis-
tration under [s]ection 2(d) of the Lanham Act 
[which bars registration if the applicant’s mark 
would cause confusion with an existing mark], the 
First Amendment claim is not as strong as with is-
sues of restraint on use. The center of balance 
changes even further when the risk of confusion of 
source, affiliation, approval, or endorsement by the 
source of the known expression outweighs the new-
comer’s claim to the right to adopt and register a 
humorous moniker.22 
Although the Board gave short shrift to the argument, it is 
noteworthy that the Board thought to mention the First Amend-
ment in a manner that appeared to concede its possible application 
in a registration proceeding.23 However, the applicant did not ac-
tually raise a constitutional defense, as opposed to merely asserting 
that parodies obviate the likelihood of confusion.24 Thus, the Board 
was not asked to decide a constitutional question, so it did not do 
so.25 
The TTAB’s rationale for ignoring these arguments is that, as 
an administrative tribunal, it lacks the power to declare the statute 
unconstitutional.26 This stance is, on its face, a curious one. The 
TTAB, a tribunal of the USPTO, which itself is within the De-
partment of Commerce, is part of the federal government.27 Its ac-
                                                                                                                            
22 Id. at 1191–92. 
23 See id. 
24 See Applicants’ Second Amended Trial Brief at 14–21, Research in Motion, Ltd. v. 
Defining Presence Mktg. Grp., Inc., 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1187 (T.T.A.B. 2012), 2011 WL 
8609564. 
25 The Board’s discussion in Research in Motion mirrors its general position that refused 
applications do not inhibit use and therefore do not implicate the First Amendment. See 
Pro-Football Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 452 (E.D. Va. 2015), appeal docketed, 
No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). But cf. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1339–43, 1345–46 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (rejecting this assertion), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 
(2016). 
26 TBMP § 102.01 (Jan. 2017). 
27 See id. 
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tions are governmental actions.28 The TTAB’s administrative 
judges are officers of the United States—they are appointed by the 
Secretary of Commerce, the head of the department for which they 
work.29 The tribunal is clearly bound by the limitations of the Con-
stitution,30 as are its constituent officers.31 Indeed, one can appeal 
TTAB decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or 
a U.S. district court, either of which will at least entertain a consti-
tutional challenge to the TTAB’s decision.32 Moreover, as the next 
section discusses, the TTAB’s stance seems out of step with that 
of other non-judicial branches of the government, which do consid-
er the constitutionality of their actions. 
The problem with the TTAB’s position can be illustrated with 
a simple, if extreme (and unrealistic) hypothetical: Suppose Con-
gress were to amend the Lanham Act and bar women (on behalf of 
themselves, or other entities, such as corporations) from register-
ing trademarks. Using the TTAB’s philosophy, the Board would 
refuse to allow a woman to register a trademark. An appeal would 
certainly succeed, with a declaration that the prohibition is uncons-
titutional. But it would require a waste of resources, both judicial 
and monetary. This hypothetical does present a conundrum for the 
TTAB. To prevent an obvious constitutional violation would ac-
tually require the Board to declare a part of the statute unconstitu-
tional (or at least to refuse to follow it). Perhaps the Board would 
be unwilling to go that far. On the other hand, as discussed below, 
other executive branch officials have not been so timid. 
                                                                                                                            
28 Id. 
29 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (declaring that Congress may vest appointment power of 
officers of the United States in heads of departments); 15 U.S.C. § 1067(b) (2012) (stating 
that the Secretary of Commerce appoints administrative trademark judges). 
30 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1321. At the very least, this is the implication of the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Tam, in which the court declared unconstitutional the 
portion of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act that bars registration of disparaging marks. See 
id. 
31 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[A]ll executive and judicial officers, both of the 
United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support 
this Constitution.”). 
32 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1321, 1358; Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 
3d 439, 454–56 (E.D. Va. 2015) (discussing, but rejecting, First Amendment challenges), 
appeal docketed, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). 
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There is, in fact, a provision of the Lanham Act that could raise 
this kind of issue. Section 2(c) bars the unconsented registration of 
the “name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the 
United States during the life of his widow.”33 What happens if the 
President is a woman? Her husband would be a widower, not a wi-
dow. Clearly, applying the statute literally would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.34 
Consider then another hypothetical: Suppose Congress were to 
amend section 2(a) of the Lanham Act to bar registration of any 
trademark that “promotes lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender 
lifestyles including, but not limited to, same-sex marriage.” Such a 
viewpoint-based prohibition would appear to be a clear First 
Amendment violation.35 Yet, the Board’s methodology would re-
quire it to ignore the First Amendment issue and only ask whether 
the proposed mark fits within the statutory prohibition. 
The TTAB appears to assert its position as a lack of authority. 
As the next section discusses, although the case law is somewhat 
muddled on this point, the TTAB’s position seems to be an unne-
cessarily extreme, and possibly incorrect, reading of the cases and 
of the Board’s authority. 
                                                                                                                            
33 Lanham Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (2012). 
34 A president in a same-sex marriage would lead to analogous issues, although 
somewhat in reverse. A male president’s spouse presumably would be deemed a widower, 
not a widow, while a female president’s spouse would be a widow. 
35 See, e.g., In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339–43, 1345–48 (rejecting both contentions and 
holding section 2(a) of the Lanham Act unconstitutional insofar as it applies to 
disparaging marks). The counter to this conclusion might be the approach of the district 
court in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse. See 112 F. Supp. 3d at 439. In Blackhorse, the court 
held that registration constitutes government speech and therefore the statute could 
prevent the expression of disfavored viewpoints. Id. at 457–58. The court also held that, 
because a refusal to register does not bar actual use, there is no First Amendment 
problem. Id. at 455–57. The Supreme Court is set to resolve these issues when it decides 
the Tam case. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1355–57. As of this writing, it is unclear whether 
the Fourth Circuit will choose to rule on the issue before the Supreme Court issues its 
ruling. 
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II.   THE AUTHORITY OF NON-JUDICIAL GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITIES TO CONSTRUE THE CONSTITUTION 
A.   The Jurisprudence of Agency Competence to Address Constitutional 
Issues 
It might seem obvious that a federal agency must have the au-
thority to interpret and apply federal constitutional principles to its 
actions.36 After all, federal trademark judges are officers of the 
United States,37 and, as such, take an oath to uphold the Constitu-
tion. However, case law has created a web of uncertainty around 
this issue. 
The TTAB’s position seems based on the principle that it lacks 
the authority to challenge the constitutionality of the trademark 
statute.38 That principle finds support in some case law.39 The 
most notable decision is probably Johnson v. Robison, where the Su-
preme Court stated: “[T]he principle that ‘[a]djudication of the 
constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been 
thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.’”40 
However, the Court did not explain why this would be so, and the 
cases cited in the Court’s opinion to support the principle are not 
necessarily on point with regard to the authority of the TTAB.41 
One of those cases is Oestereich v. Selective Services Board, where 
                                                                                                                            
36 One might say the same of a state agency. Interestingly, however, some state 
agencies are barred by state law from considering constitutional challenges. See, e.g., CAL. 
CONST. art. III, § 3.5 (barring state agencies from refusing to enforce a statute on state or 
federal constitutional grounds (or federal statutory grounds) unless an appellate court has 
ruled that the statute is unenforceable or unconstitutional).  For a discussion of state 
agency competence to decide constitutional issues, see generally Katherine Shaw, State 
Administrative Constitutionalism, 69 ARK. L. REV. 527 (2016). 
37 See 15 U.S.C. § 1067(b) (2012). 
38 TBMP § 102.01 (Jan. 2017) (stating that the Board, as an administrative tribunal, has 
no authority to declare laws unconstitutional). 
39 A law review note from almost forty years ago calls it “traditional wisdom” that 
agencies could not pass on the constitutionality of statutes. Note, The Authority of 
Administrative Agencies to Consider the Constitutionality of Statutes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 
1684 (1977). However, more recent scholarship indicates that agencies frequently 
interpret the Constitution. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 
91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897–98 (2013). 
40 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974) (quoting Oestereich v. Selective Servs. Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 
242 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
41 See id. 
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Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion set forth specific reasons why 
it would be inappropriate for Selective Services Boards to pass on 
the constitutionality of the governing statute: 
[T]he composition of the boards, and their adminis-
trative procedures, render them wholly unsuitable 
forums for the adjudication of matters: local and ap-
peal Boards consist of part-time, uncompensated 
members, chosen ideally to be representative of the 
registrants’ communities; the fact that a registrant 
may not be represented by counsel in Selective Ser-
vice proceedings seems incompatible with the 
Boards’ serious consideration of such purely legal 
claims.42 
None of those deficiencies plague the TTAB. Its members are 
lawyers—experts in their fields—and presumably at ease with con-
stitutional concepts. Parties appearing before the Board may (and 
usually do) have counsel. Although TTAB proceedings are not 
formal adjudicatory hearings before an administrative law judge, its 
proceedings do emulate court proceedings—they use the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence wherever possible,43 and 
their factual findings may be given preclusive effect by Article III 
courts.44 
Another case cited in Johnson (taken from Justice Harlan’s 
opinion in Oesterich) is Public Utilities Commission v. United States, 
where the main issue was the ability of the United States to bypass 
California’s administrative process and seek declaratory relief from 
a court as to its claims of preemption of state rules.45 Thus, the 
Court’s implications about the California agency’s ability or wil-
lingness to entertain a constitutional challenge must be viewed in 
that context. Moreover, the California Constitution specifically 
prohibits state agencies from ruling on constitutional challenges to 
                                                                                                                            
42 393 U.S. 233, 242–43 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
43 See TBMP § 101.02 (Jan. 2017) (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.116, 2.122(a) (2016)) 
(describing use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence in 
inter partes proceedings). The TTAB Manual of Procedure also notes that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence are usually applied in ex parte appeals to the Board. See id. 
44 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
45 355 U.S. 534, 539–40 (1958). 
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the enforcement of the agency’s statutory directives.46 The TTAB 
is a federal agency and there is no express statutory or constitu-
tional bar to its examining constitutional arguments. Additionally, 
the job of the TTAB is somewhat different than the Public Utilities 
Commission—it is not regulatory in the same manner.47 
The sweeping principle enunciated in Johnson is not well sup-
ported by the case law on which it relies, nor on the facts of the 
case itself. Nowhere does the Court justify such a principle by an 
appeal to a constitutional limitation, either express or implied. 
Moreover, in Johnson, the precise question was whether a statutory 
bar to judicial review of Veterans Administration determinations 
included a bar to judicial review of constitutional questions.48 The 
Court, without expressly endorsing the Veterans Administration’s 
refusal to entertain constitutional challenges, held that the statuto-
ry bar did not apply to constitutional questions.49 Thus, the thrust 
of Johnson and Oestereich was the availability of judicial considera-
tion of constitutional questions. The issue of agency authority was, 
at best, incidental to the main issue. Furthermore, unlike the cir-
cumstances in Johnson and Oestereich, it is clear that Article III 
judicial review of TTAB decisions is available. 
In the subsequent case of Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, the 
Supreme Court made it clear that Johnson should not be read as 
endorsing a broad principle that agencies per se lack authority to 
hear constitutional issues.50 The issue in Thunder Basin (analogous 
to the other cases discussed above) was the availability of pre-
enforcement review in a federal district court of a challenge to the 
Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, without first 
                                                                                                                            
46 See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5(b). 
47 See Eng’rs Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 138 F.2d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir. 
1943), vacated as moot, 332 U.S. 788 (1947) (parties jointly moved to vacate). This 
decision, also cited in the Johnson opinion, noted that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) refused to rule on the “constitutionality of the Act which it is 
called upon to administer.” Id. However, the court remarked that agencies are sometimes 
called upon to make rulings on factual issues, such as “interstate commerce,” that bear 
on constitutional issues. Id. at 953. Moreover, as this Article discusses later, the SEC, at 
least more recently, has addressed constitutional issues. 
48 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366–67 (1974). 
49 Id. at 367–74. 
50 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994). 
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going through the agency process.51 In passing, the Court stated: 
“[W]e agree that ‘[a]djudication of the constitutionality of con-
gressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the juris-
diction of administrative agencies.’”52 However, the Court went 
on to state the following: “This rule is not mandatory, however, and 
is perhaps of less consequence where, as here, the reviewing body 
is not the agency itself but an independent commission established 
exclusively to adjudicate Mine Act disputes . . . . The Commission 
has addressed constitutional questions in previous enforcement proceed-
ings.”53 
In Thunder Basin, the Court cited its decision in Califano v. 
Sanders, which stated (without citation to authority): “Constitu-
tional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administra-
tive hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is es-
sential to the decision of such questions.”54 But, as the quoted lan-
guage makes clear, the focus of Califano was on the availability of 
judicial review of the agency’s decision in an Article III court. (The 
same issue was at the heart of Thunder Basin and the other cases 
cited above as well.) Thus, “resolution” of constitutional questions 
may well be best handled in full-fledged Article III courts, provided 
that a party wishes to bring the case to those courts. But there is no 
reason to preclude an agency, particularly one with primary juris-
diction, from addressing such questions in the first instance. That 
may obviate the need for a party to seek redress in Article III 
courts, saving judicial resources and party money. In fact, the 
Court’s language in Thunder Basin makes it clear that agencies may 
do just that.55 Moreover, since factual issues resolved by the TTAB 
                                                                                                                            
51 Id. at 202. 
52 Id. (quoting Johnson, 415 U.S. at 368). 
53 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
54 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977) (emphasis added); see also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 
(1977). In Weinberger, the Court stated, in passing, that “once the Secretary has satisfied 
himself that the only issue is the constitutionality of a statutory requirement, a matter 
which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine . . . .” Weinberger, 422 U.S. 749 at 765. But 
the Court cited no support for this proposition. Moreover, it was not essential to the 
decision, which turned on an issue of proper judicial review. 
55 See, e.g., Bonnichsen v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 650–51 (D. Or. 
1997) (noting that Thunder Basin indicates that agencies may address constitutional 
arguments and that, in any case, agencies may construe statutes to avoid constitutional 
issues). 
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may now be deemed preclusive in subsequent proceedings in Ar-
ticle III courts, it is essential that they be made in the proper con-
text, including the constitutional context. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Elgin v. Department of the 
Treasury,56 which was decided after Thunder Basin, illustrates how 
the issue of agency authority to interpret and apply the Constitu-
tion can become entangled with the issue of availability of review 
by Article III courts, with concomitant confusion for the authority 
issue.57 In Elgin, the plaintiffs wanted to challenge their dismissal 
from their jobs by the Treasury Department because of their failure 
to register with the Selective Service.58 They alleged that the dis-
missal violated the Equal Protection Clause (because only males 
are subject to registration), and that the law mandating their dis-
missal constituted a bill of attainder.59 However, rather than use 
the statutorily mandated administrative process for challenges to 
personnel actions—a hearing before the Merit Systems Protection 
Board (“MSPB”), with review available by the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit—the Elgin plaintiffs brought an action in 
federal district court to adjudicate their claims.60 Chief among the 
plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of district court power to hear the 
action was that the MSPB lacked the authority to address their 
constitutional claims, and that the Federal Circuit’s power was de-
rivative of the MSPB, thereby depriving the appellate court of the 
power to hear the claims.61 Although it disagreed with this argu-
ment—instead finding that the statute did not deprive the Federal 
Circuit of authority to hear constitutional claims—the Supreme 
Court did note that the MSPB does refuse to hear certain types of 
constitutional claims.62 But the Court expressly declined to rule on 
                                                                                                                            
56 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012). 
57 See id. 
58 Id. at 2129. 
59 See id. at 2131. The bill of attainder argument was apparently a claim that the 
statutory exclusion from employment legislatively punished men aged twenty-six and 
older due to past conduct—i.e., not registering for Selective Service. See Elgin v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 641 F.3d 6, 18–20 (1st Cir. 2011) (Stahl, J., concurring), aff’d, 132 S. 
Ct. 2126 (2012). 
60 Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132. 
61 Id. at 2136–37. 
62 Id. at 2136. 
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the correctness of the MSPB’s refusal, since it was not necessary to 
determine the issue at bar.63 
The Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of agency competence 
to address constitutional claims leaves much to be desired. Howev-
er, it does appear to recognize the power of agencies to at least hear 
and determine some kinds of constitutional arguments, particularly 
where the agency’s determination is subject to review by an Article 
III court.64 
B.    Agency Willingness to Address Constitutional Issues 
Although the Supreme Court has been less than clear on this is-
sue, the Court’s reticence to clarify the matter has not entirely de-
terred agencies and other non-judicial governmental actors from 
                                                                                                                            
63 See id. 
64 In patent law, parties have challenged the reexamination procedures of the Patent 
Office (and, lately, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, or PTAB) on the ground that, 
among other things, patent cancellation requires an Article III court action and is subject 
to a jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment. See TBMP § 102.01 (Jan. 2017) 
(stating that the Board lacks jurisdiction to hear infringement or unfair competition 
claims); see also Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 603–05 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(rejecting Article III and Seventh Amendment challenges to reexamination proceedings). 
Thus far, these challenges have been rejected based, to a large degree, on a public versus 
private rights distinction. See, e.g., Joy Techs. V. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 228–29 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). It is unclear whether trademark registrations should be treated like patents in 
this regard. Although patents and trademarks are both forms of intellectual property 
rights, a trademark registration, which is all that the TTAB oversees, is not the sole source 
of trademark rights, which also derives from common law. Patents, on the other hand, are 
granted only by the USPTO. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2012) (providing that the USPTO is 
“responsible for granting and issuing of patents”). But, if the issue is whether trademark 
registrations have independent value, the decision in Tam indicates that trademark 
registrations should be regarded as valuable apart from the common law rights in a 
trademark. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. 
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). Ascribing independent value to registrations tends to favor 
viewing registrations as public rights, not requiring Article III courts to make decisions. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in B & B Hardware v. Hargis Industries, Inc., allowing 
preclusive use of TTAB findings, also suggests that the TTAB has sufficient status to be 
treated as a kind of court—albeit an Article I court. See 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015); see also 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1986) (noting that 
the Commodities Exchange Act gave the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
power in a limited area of law, with review by Article III courts, and upholding the 
Commission’s power to hear a counterclaim raising only private rights). Like the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the TTAB has jurisdiction over a 
limited area of law. But, unlike the CFTC, the TTAB cannot exercise jurisdiction over 
“private rights” counterclaims. 
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addressing constitutional claims. In contrast to the TTAB, other 
non-judicial arms of the government (i.e., agencies and Executive 
Branch departments) regularly examine the constitutionality of 
their actions. 
The recent Supreme Court case Zivotofsky v. Kerry provides an 
interesting example.65 Congress passed a law requiring the State 
Department to allow people born in Jerusalem to put “Israel” as 
their place of birth on their passports.66 However, both Presidents 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama viewed the statute (which was 
signed into law by President Bush) as an unconstitutional intrusion 
on their power to conduct foreign affairs.67 Thus, when Zivo-
tofsky’s parents invoked the statute and requested that his passport 
state his place of birth as Israel, the State Department refused, 
which led to a lawsuit.68 Although the Supreme Court ultimately 
upheld the State Department’s position, it is the initial refusal that 
is significant.69 The President and Secretary of State acted on their 
own interpretation of the Constitution. Thus, an Executive Branch 
department refused to apply a clearly applicable statute based on its 
own determination that the statute was unconstitutional. Although 
it took a Supreme Court decision to actually declare the statute un-
constitutional, this did not prevent the State Department from act-
ing on its own determination of constitutional power.70 
Another interesting example is Matter of Compean, an interim 
decision by the Attorney General.71 For a number of years, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) analyzed claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel in deportation proceedings according to a 
                                                                                                                            
65 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2078 (2015). 
66 See id. at 2082 (discussing section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act). 
67 Id. (noting the signing statement of President Bush); Steven D. Schwinn, Zivotofsky 
v. Kerry: A Study in Law, Politics, and Foreign Affairs, 79 SOC. EDUC., no. 1, Jan./Feb. 
2015, at 30, 32 (describing the Obama administration’s position that section 214(d) 
“impermissibly interferes with the president’s exclusive power”). 
68 See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (A.G. 2009). (Thank you to my colleague, Stewart Chang, who 
pointed me to this decision.). 
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framework established by the BIA in a 1988 decision.72 The BIA’s 
framework was overruled by the Attorney General at the end of 
President George W. Bush’s Administration on the ground that 
there was no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel 
in deportation proceedings.73 After President Obama took office, 
the new Attorney General reviewed the Compean decision and re-
versed it (while directing the Executive Office for Immigration Re-
view to institute rulemaking proceedings on the subject).74 For this 
Article’s purposes, the back and forth between the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office and the Bureau of Immigration Appeals illuminates 
the issue posed by the TTAB’s position. The Board of Immigration 
Appeals, a non-Article III tribunal, was willing to entertain (and 
even on occasion uphold) a constitutional argument—ineffective 
assistance of counsel—and even provided its own framework for 
analyzing the issue. Two Attorney Generals—Executive Branch 
officials—also addressed the issue, making their own constitutional 
arguments (albeit both operating as reviewing officials of the BIA). 
But, one might say, the BIA is operating in an almost criminal situ-
ation, namely deportation and removal proceedings. The stakes are 
much different than a trademark registration—not that this really 
should make it more appropriate as a matter of sheer power for one 
agency to refuse to entertain constitutional arguments. 
But quasi-criminal proceedings are not the only situations in 
which agencies assert power to address constitutional issues. Other 
agencies with quasi-judicial power, such as the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (“FCC”), do not shrink from addressing the constitutional 
implications of their proceedings. One of the important functions 
of the FTC is to police false and misleading advertising.75 Clearly, 
this task implicates First Amendment concerns as it involves regu-
lating the content of a form of speech: advertising. Although adver-
tising may not always enjoy full First Amendment protection, it 
                                                                                                                            
72 See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988), overruled by Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 
1 (A.G. 2009). 
73 Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 2. 
74 Id. 
75 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012) (giving the FTC the power to regulate “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices”); id. § 52 (prohibiting false advertising for “food, drugs, 
devices, services, or cosmetics”). 
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still can claim significant constitutional protection.76 The FTC is 
empowered to bring quasi-judicial proceedings against those who 
use false or misleading advertising.77 These proceedings reflect the 
understanding that constitutional issues are implicit in such regula-
tion. Forty years ago, in a case involving advertising for eggs, the 
FTC recognized a constitutional distinction between pure com-
mercial promotion and other forms of advertising: 
These advertisements, [relating to health aspects of 
eggs], do not carry the strong promotional message 
concerning eggs that the other challenged adver-
tisements convey. The principal thrust of CX 171-
173 is information concerning eggs and cholesterol, 
a matter of public concern. CX 175-176 also seem to 
fall in the category of advertisements concerned 
primarily with conveying a message on matters of 
public concern, including comment on governmen-
tal action. CX 171-173 and CX 175-176 were disse-
minated subsequent to issuance of the complaint 
herein, and may warrant First Amendment protec-
tion. Accordingly, no finding of a violation of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act is predicated on 
these documents.78 
In the same case, the Commission further addressed the consti-
tutional aspects of the commercial/non-commercial divide.79 
Ten years later, in an antitrust action against the District of Co-
lumbia Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, whose members 
had refused to accept criminal defense appointments unless fees 
were increased, the FTC addressed a defense that the lawyers’ ac-
                                                                                                                            
76 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. 
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1980). 
77 See § 45(b). 
78 Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 162–63 (1976) (citation omitted). 
“CX 171-173” and the other numbered markers in the quoted paragraph refer to the ads 
at issue in the case. See id. 
79 Id. at 164–66 (addressing constitutional arguments and finding that other 
advertisements were commercial speech and were not protected by the First 
Amendment). 
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tions constituted a constitutionally protected political boycott.80 
Further evidence of the FTC’s strong belief in its ability to address 
constitutional claims is provided by an interagency comment sent 
by the FTC to the U.S. Mint.81 In that memorandum, the FTC 
touted its experience applying the First Amendment to advertise-
ments as evidence that the Mint should welcome its assistance in 
promulgating regulations on the use of various words and symbols 
by entities other than the Mint when they produce Mint-like prod-
ucts.82 
The FCC’s regulatory actions similarly implicate First 
Amendment concerns as they directly regulate communication via 
broadcasting. And the FCC recognizes and addresses the constitu-
tional implications of its regulation.83 In the case In re 21st Century 
Fax(es) Ltd., the FCC imposed a fine for willful violation of the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.84 The respondent argued 
that the statute violated the First Amendment.85 The Commission, 
noting that the Act had been upheld by federal courts, rejected the 
constitutional argument.86 It further noted that “administrative 
agencies are to presume that the statutes that Congress directs 
them to implement are constitutional,”87 indicating that the Com-
                                                                                                                            
80 Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 107 F.T.C. 510 (1986) (opinion by an 
administrative law judge). 
81 Staff of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, Bureau of Economics and the Office of 
Policy Planning of the Federal Trade Commission, Comment on Assessment of Civil 
Penalties for Misuse of Words, Letters, Symbols, and Emblems of the United States Mint 
(Mar. 11, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_ 
documents/ftc-staff-comment-united-states-mint-concerning-civil-penalties-misuse-
mint-words-letters-symbols/050315usmintcomment.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5VD-75VJ] 
[hereinafter FTC Staff Comment]. 
82 See id. at 2–3 (discussing the FTC’s constitutional interpretations). 
83 See, e.g., Rubber City Radio Grp., 17 FCC Rcd. 14745, 14745 (2002) (“The First 
Amendment, however, is a critical constitutional limitation that demands we proceed 
cautiously and with appropriate restraint.”). For a discussion of another example of the 
FCC’s use of constitutional principles, see Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: 
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 
810–21 (2010) (discussing the FCC’s use of the state action doctrine). 
84 17 FCC Rcd. 1384 (2002). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1388. 
87 Id. Interestingly, in making this statement, the FCC cited Johnson v. Robison and 
quoted the portion of the case (from Oestereich) that seemed to deny agency power to hold 
the statute unconstitutional. See id. at 1388 n.26 (citing 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974)). 
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mission believed it had the authority to find the statute unconstitu-
tional if the presumption was rebutted. In an earlier decision in the 
case In re Application of WGBH Educational Foundation, which chal-
lenged the license renewal of WGBH-TV, the Commission stated: 
“With regard to ‘indecent’ or ‘profane’ utterances, the First 
Amendment and the ‘no censorship’ provision of [s]ection 326 of 
the Communications Act severely limit any role by the Commis-
sion and the courts in enforcing the proscription contained in 
[s]ection 1464.”88 The Commission went on to discuss the Su-
preme Court’s then-recent decision in FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion,89 stating: “We believe that we should construe the Pacifica 
holding consistent with the paramount importance we attach to 
encouraging free-ranging programming and editorial discretion by 
broadcasters.”90 
Another agency whose decisions implicate constitutional issues 
is the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The most 
obvious constitutional issue for the SEC is the First Amendment, 
which is relevant to the SEC’s disclosure requirements. However, 
the SEC has also been willing to address more fundamental consti-
tutional issues, such as questions that address the constitutionality 
of its composition. In the Matter of Raymond J. Lucia Companies, 
Inc., the target of an SEC proceeding challenged the agency’s in-
ternal quasi-judicial proceeding on the ground that the administra-
tive law judge was not properly appointed in conformance with the 
Appointments Clause of the Constitution.91 The Commission re-
                                                                                                                            
88 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978). 
89 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
90 WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d at 1254; see also Rubber City Radio Grp., 17 FCC 
Rcd. 14745, 14746 (2002) (The agency concluded that a radio station violated the 
Commission’s indecency policy, stating: “The First Amendment, however, is a critical 
constitutional limitation that demands we proceed cautiously and with appropriate 
restraint.”). The FCC has noted, however, that its authority to hear constitutional issues 
is discretionary, and it has sometimes declined to hear such claims outside of the First 
Amendment context. See, e.g., WXTC License P’ship, G.P., 15 FCC Rcd. 692 (2000) 
(declining to address argument that section 614 of the Communications Act is an 
unconstitutional taking). 
91 Exchange Act Release No. 75,837, Investment Advisors Release No. 4,190, 
Investment Company Release No. 31,806, 112 SEC Docket 6 (Sept. 3, 2015), petition 
denied, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, vacated, 2017 WL 631744 (D.C. Cir. 
Feb. 16, 2017). 
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jected the argument on the merits.92 Moreover, the Commission 
specifically alluded to its authority to address such fundamental 
issues, and the desirability of its addressing the issues in the first 
instance, prior to review by the courts.93 Furthermore, as its cita-
tions in Lucia made clear, the SEC is not shy about addressing con-
stitutional issues in its proceedings.94 It has also been noted that 
the Tax Court, from fairly early in the twentieth century, has ruled 
on the constitutionality of statutes.95 Although other examples 
could be given, these examples suffice to demonstrate that federal 
agencies and federal non-judicial officials do not uniformly shy 
away from addressing the constitutional issues implicit in their ac-
tions. 
On the other hand, the TTAB is not alone in its reluctance to 
adjudicate the constitutionality of its governing statutes. For exam-
ple, in 2010, the Register of Copyrights was asked whether she, or a 
copyright royalty judge, has the authority to adjudicate the consti-
tutionality of certain provisions of the Copyright Act relating to the 
use of settlements under the Webcaster Settlement Acts in pro-
ceedings before the Copyright Royalty Board. The Register re-
sponded that she was without such authority, citing the “general 
rule” that agencies are without authority to adjudicate the consti-
tutionality of their governing statutes.96 The Register cited the Su-
preme Court cases discussed above as the source of this “general 
rule.”97 
As indicated in Elgin, the MSPB takes a somewhat limited view 
of its authority to address constitutional issues.98 This is further 
illustrated in Bayly v. Office of Personnel Management, in which the 
Office of Personnel Management refused to address appellant’s 
contention that the statute (which “mandate[s] termination of sur-
vivor annuity benefits upon marriage prior to age 55”) constituted 
                                                                                                                            
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. (citing rulings on double jeopardy and the Seventh Amendment). 
95 Note, supra note 39, at 1687. 
96 The Register of Copyrights’ and the Copyright Royalty Judges’ Authority to 
Determine the Constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(5), 75 Fed. Reg. 26,278, 26,280 
(May 11, 2010). 
97 Id. 
98 Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 (2012). 
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a denial of equal protection.99 However, the MSPB made a point of 
distinguishing the question presented in this case, which attacked 
the statute itself, from the situation in which a party only questions 
the constitutionality of the application of the statute.100 Thus, an as-
applied challenge may be addressed, even if a facial challenge to the 
statute would not. On the other hand, as demonstrated by the ex-
amples above, some agencies, such as the SEC, take the Court at its 
word in Thunder Basin that agencies are not without authority to 
address constitutional issues, even facial claims.101 
The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges was 
addressed by the District of Columbia Circuit in Continental Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transportation.102 In a dispute relating to 
the Department of Transportation’s interpretation of a statute, the 
court stated: 
[I]t cannot be gainsaid that, in carrying on its inter-
pretive function, an agency must be mindful of the 
higher demands of the Constitution. To be sure, the 
Department is powerless to determine the constitu-
tionality of the statute itself, as the Supreme Court 
plainly held in Weinberger v. Salfi . . . . As we see it, 
the agency was never given a shot at wrestling with 
the statute in a way that, in the agency’s view, 
would comport with the demands of the First 
Amendment . . . .103 
                                                                                                                            
99 42 M.S.P.R. 524, 525 (M.S.P.B. 1990). 
100 Id. (citing May v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 38 M.S.P.R. 534, 538 (M.S.P.B. 
1988)); cf. Elgin v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 641 F.3d 6, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2011), (citing Bayly 
for the proposition that the MSPB cannot “determine the constitutionality of [f]ederal 
statutes,” but noting that constitutional claims arise frequently in agency personnel 
discharge proceedings (quoting Bayly, 42 M.S.P.R. at 525–26)), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2126 
(2012). 
101 See, e.g., Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75,837, Investment 
Advisors Release No. 4,190, Investment Company Release No. 31,806, 112 SEC Docket 6 
(Sept. 3, 2015), petition denied, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, vacated, 2017 
WL 631744 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). 
102 843 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
103 Id. at 1455–56 (citations omitted). It may be worth noting that in Weinberger v. Salfi, 
the “plain” holding of the Court looks more like an aside (or two asides): 
In the present case, the complaint seeks review of the denial of 
benefits based on the plain wording of a statute which is alleged to be 
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It seems clear that the D.C. Circuit assumed that an agency has 
the power to determine whether a particular application of a statute 
would comport with the Constitution, even if it might not have the 
power to rule a statute unconstitutional on its face.104 
At least two things emerge from this discussion. First, many 
agencies and Executive Branch officials believe that they have the 
authority to rule on constitutional issues.105 In some cases, they 
rule on issues fundamental to their authority.106 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Thunder Basin lends support to these assertions 
of authority,107 but some agency assertions of such power precede 
that decision.108 Second, there may be a distinction between declar-
ing a portion of a governing statute unconstitutional (as the Federal 
Circuit did in the case In re Tam),109 and declaring a particular ap-
plication of the law unconstitutional. However, it should be noted 
that in Zivotofsky the Executive Branch was not shy about ignoring 
a statutory command on constitutional grounds.110 But an adminis-
trative judge of the TTAB, a creature of statute who does not di-
                                                                                                                            
unconstitutional. That a denial on such grounds, which are beyond 
the power of the Secretary to affect, is nonetheless a decision of the 
Secretary for these purposes has been heretofore established. 
422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975). The Court also stated: “Plainly these purposes have been 
served once the Secretary has satisfied himself that the only issue is the constitutionality 
of a statutory requirement, a matter which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine . . . .” 
Id. at 765. However, the Court did not cite any authority for the latter proposition. See id. 
104 See Bonnichen v. U.S., Dep’t of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 651 (D. Or. 1997) 
(stating that agencies may construe statutes to be consistent with the Constitution); see 
also Marozan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1492 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting) (“Nothing about the constitutional hierarchy implies that only judges have the 
power to place the Constitution above mere law. Every governmental official has the duty 
to do this. The power of judicial review comes from the hierarchy of rules, with the 
Constitution superior to law; that same hierarchy applies to every other governmental 
actor, and each takes an oath of obedience to the Constitution.”). 
105 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2080 (2015); see also Compean, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. 1, 3 (A.G. 2009); Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 162–66 (1976); 
Raymond J. Lucia Cos., 2015 WL 7785971. 
106 See, e.g., Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 3. 
107 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994). 
108 See, e.g., Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. at 89. 
109 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. 
Ct. 30 (2016). 
110 Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083. 
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rectly report to the President, might believe that caution is war-
ranted in the constitutional sphere. 
Although as an agency the USPTO is subject to legislative limi-
tations on its authority, there is nothing in the Lanham Act that 
precludes the TTAB from deciding constitutional questions.111 
That TTAB decisions can be appealed to an Article III court does 
not prevent the Board from deciding such questions on its own; 
indeed, it suggests that the Board does possess such authority, sub-
ject to review by a District Court or the Federal Circuit. The 
Board’s statement in Brunetti that the TTAB is not a proper forum 
“for re-evaluating the impacts of any evolving First Amendment 
jurisprudence within Article III courts” on the interpretation of the 
Lanham Act112 ignores its responsibility as a government agency to 
account for the possibly variable limitations on its own authority that 
result from constitutional decisions. After all, if the Federal Cir-
cuit, or another circuit court were to direct the TTAB to conduct a 
constitutional review of the application of the Lanham Act in the 
registration context, it would seem that the TTAB is bound to 
comply. 
C.   Does Independence Affect Agency Willingness to Hear 
Constitutional Claims? 
The observation that the TTAB is composed of administrative 
judges could help explain the TTAB’s reluctance to address consti-
tutional issues. In the above discussion, the agencies most willing 
to address constitutional issues—the FTC, FCC, and SEC—all 
use administrative law judges (“ALJs”), not administrative judges 
(“AJs”), to conduct their adjudicative hearings.113 AJs are em-
ployed and reviewed directly by the agency, whereas ALJs are 
                                                                                                                            
111 See generally Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). 
112 Brunetti, No. 85310960, 2014 WL 3976439 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014), appeal docketed, 
No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2014). 
113 See Administrative Law Judges, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/ 
administrative-law-judges [https://perma.cc/RF9D-PTFN] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016); 
Office of Administrative Law Judges, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/bureaus-offices/office-administrative-law-judges [https://perma.cc/86GR-MAXP] 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2016); Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/alj [https://perma.cc/H27E-MJL9] (last visited Nov. 4, 
2016). 
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hired through the Office of Personnel Management.114 ALJs are 
seen as more independent than AJs, in part because ALJ perfor-
mance is not subject to direct control by the agency.115 If this per-
ception is accurate, and AJs are less independent than ALJs, then 
the relatively less independent AJ may be more reluctant to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the agency’s governing statute. 
Similarly, independence could explain the State Department’s 
willingness to challenge the constitutionality of Congress’ direction 
to issue passports designating Jerusalem, Israel, as a birthplace.116 
Presumably, the decision to challenge the law was made at the 
highest levels of the State Department, thus insulating the decision 
maker from retribution within the agency.117 The MSPB, which 
took a middle position, also takes the middle ground regarding 
hearing officers.118 In some cases it uses AJs, while at other times it 
uses ALJs.119 
In sum, there is some evidence that a willingness to address 
constitutional arguments is related to the relative independence of 
the decision maker. That, of course, should not determine whether 
there is authority to consider such arguments. Nevertheless, it sug-
gests that the AJs of the USPTO may seek a cautious approach to 
constitutional arguments. The next Part considers how an agency 
like the USPTO might cautiously address constitutional issues. 
                                                                                                                            
114 Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1647 
(2016). 
115 Id. at 1654–56. 
116 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015). 
117 One of the examples of an agency addressing a constitutional issue came from the 
staff of the FTC, not a hearing officer. See FTC Staff Comment, supra note 84. But the 
FTC is an independent agency, unlike the USPTO, which is part of the Department of 
Commerce. TBMP § 102.01 (Jan. 2017). This independence may allow its staff to feel 
freer to address the issues. 
118 See Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012). 
119 See How to File an Appeal, U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, http:// 
www.mspb.gov/appeals/appeals.htm [https://perma.cc/WKZ9-ZZ7S] (last visited Nov. 
4, 2016) (discussing use of AJs for appeals); Jurisdiction, U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS 
PROTECTION BOARD, http://www.mspb.gov/About/jurisdiction.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
ZD4Z-EVCE] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (This page discusses the use of ALJs for certain 
original jurisdiction proceedings, stating: “Special Counsel cases and actions against 
administrative law judges are heard by the Board Administrative Law Judge, who issues 
an initial decision.”). 
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III.   ADDRESSING CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AND THE 
AVOIDANCE PRINCIPLE 
As discussed above, the TTAB’s refusal to address constitu-
tional issues stems from its assertion that, as an administrative 
body, it lacks power to declare laws unconstitutional.120 This may 
be a logical corollary of the Supreme Court’s statement in Marbury 
v. Madison that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”121 However, as the Su-
preme Court indicated in Thunder Basin, agencies do have the 
power to address constitutional issues.122 Even if one concedes a 
lack of power to formally declare laws unconstitutional (while not-
ing that this has not prevented other Executive Branch agencies 
from considering such questions),123 that does not justify the 
Board’s refusal to entertain constitutional issues at all. As was the 
case of the Commission in Thunder Basin, the TTAB is well suited 
to do so as it is a quasi-judicial body, most of whose members do 
not otherwise participate in the USPTO’s regulatory process.124 
The Board exercises quasi-judicial power.125 Furthermore, the D.C. 
Circuit’s Continental Airlines decision shows that an agency should 
be able to at least address an as-applied constitutional challenge (as 
opposed to a facial challenge) in the context of an agency proceed-
ing.126 Yet the TTAB refuses even to make the reasonable distinc-
tion that would permit it to address constitutional issues. 
A. As-Applied vs. Facial Constitutional Challenges 
One way that the TTAB could address constitutional issues 
would be to distinguish between a facial challenge to the statute 
and a challenge that only pertains to its application in a particular 
setting. A facial challenge asserts that the law cannot be applied in a 
                                                                                                                            
120 See, e.g., Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1832–33 (T.T.A.B. 1994). 
121 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
122 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994). 
123 See sources cited supra note 105. 
124 See 15 U.S.C. § 1067(b) (2012). The Director of the USPTO, the Deputy Director of 
the USPTO, the Commissioner for Patents, and the Commissioner for Trademarks are 
members of the Board, although they are greatly outnumbered by appointed trademark 
judges. See id. 
125 See § 1067(a). 
126 Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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constitutional manner as to any situation covered by the statute.127 
Such a challenge tests the limits of agency power because it forces 
the agency to, in some cases, declare a statute, or a portion of a sta-
tute, unenforceable.128 An as-applied challenge only asserts that 
enforcement of the statute in this particular context would violate 
the Constitution.129 It does not require a declaration that Congress 
has exceeded its power in enacting the statute.130 It only requires a 
determination that the statute cannot be applied in this particular 
situation.131 
As federal officers, members of the TTAB are bound to uphold 
the Constitution.132 Refusing even to consider whether a particular 
action on their part would violate the Constitution seems to be con-
trary to the oath of office. Moreover, to the extent that Johnson v. 
Robison is still seen (after Thunder Basin) as a bar to the authority of 
an agency to find its governing statute unconstitutional, using as-
applied analyses is perfectly consistent with that principle.133 The 
agency is not called upon to challenge the legitimacy of its govern-
ing statute, which remains in force for all constitutionally legitimate 
purposes.134 
The discussion in Section II.B demonstrates that, the great ma-
jority of the time, those issues involve as-applied challenges rather 
than challenges to the legitimacy of the governing statute.135 Thus, 
the FTC’s discussions of constitutional principles involved par-
ticular applications of the FTC’s authority to advertising and the 
                                                                                                                            
127 This was the conclusion of the Federal Circuit regarding the disparagement 
provision of the Lanham Act. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
128 See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lundquist & Pamela C. Corley, The Multiple-Stage Process of 
Judicial Review: Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges, 40 J. LEG. STUD. 467, 475 
(2011) (noting that an as-applied challenge is less of an institutional challenge to the 
legislature). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 See Marozan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1492 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting). 
133 415 U.S. 361, 370 n.12 (1974). 
134 Id at 383. 
135 See generally Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657 (2010). 
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consequent interaction with First Amendment principles.136 They 
did not implicate the FTC’s authority to regulate advertising in 
general.137 Similarly, the FCC’s discussions of First Amendment 
limits on its authority were in the context of particular cases; the 
FCC did not purport to challenge the constitutionality of the go-
verning statute.138 Indeed, its statement that its authority should be 
read with the First Amendment in mind139 is exactly the sort of 
principle that should guide the TTAB. 
By contrast, in Harjo the Board dismissed the distinction be-
tween an as-applied challenge and a facial challenge to the statutory 
ban on registration of disparaging or scandalous marks.140 The 
Board stated that it was “a distinction without a difference.”141 
However, the Board’s focus continued to be on its perceived lack 
of authority to declare laws unconstitutional.142 It did not explain 
why it believed that declaring a failure to register a particular mark 
on the grounds of disparagement and/or scandalousness amounts 
to a declaration that a portion of the Lanham Act was unconstitu-
tional.143 
B. The Avoidance Principle 
If the TTAB will not address constitutional issues directly, is 
there a way to allow it to address the Constitution in a manner that 
avoids the issue of agency power to declare laws or agency actions 
unconstitutional? The answer lies in the principle that courts (and, 
presumably, agencies) should seek to interpret statutes in ways that 
avoid constitutional decisions unless absolutely necessary. 
The idea of avoiding constitutional decisions dates back to the 
nineteenth century,144 but it is most commonly associated with Jus-
                                                                                                                            
136 Id.; see also Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 162–66 (1976). 
137 See Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. at 162–66; see also FTC Staff Comment, supra note 81. 
138 See 21st Century Fax(es) Ltd., 17 FCC Rcd. 1384, 1388 (2002). 
139 Id. 
140 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1710 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F. 
Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See, e.g., Liverpool & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 
(1885). 
2017] TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 537 
 
tice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority.145 Justice Brandeis set out seven (sometimes overlap-
ping) principles, the last of which is particularly relevant here: 
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn 
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitu-
tionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this 
Court will first ascertain whether the construction 
of the statute is fairly possible by which the question 
may be avoided.146 
As many scholars have chronicled, the Ashwander avoidance 
principles have been widely cited by courts.147 However, the avoid-
ance principle is not a panacea, either for courts or agencies. Scho-
lars have identified flaws in the doctrine. As noted constitutional 
scholar Frederick Schauer has pointed out, there are costs asso-
ciated with avoiding constitutional decisions.148 Courts may make 
strained interpretations of statutes that stray from the drafters’ in-
tent in order to avoid constitutional issues, for example.149 It may 
not accurately reflect the will of Congress to assume that even a 
tortured interpretation of a statute is preferable to ruling it uncons-
titutional.150 Avoidance also evades political accountability for odd 
interpretations of statutes, since Congress may not have the same 
incentive to amend a statute after a flawed construction that it has 
when a statute is struck down.151 Avoidance is also somewhat of a 
misnomer, in that it does not truly avoid a constitutional decision; 
it simply changes the parameters of the analysis.152 Thus, avoid-
ance does not necessarily avoid constitutional discussions, because 
one must identify and discuss a serious constitutional issue as part 
                                                                                                                            
145 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
146 Id. at 348 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). 
147 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 73 (1995). 
148 Id. at 74. 
149 Id. at 74, 81–82. 
150 See generally Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding 
Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 331 (2015). 
151 See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 
(1998). 
152 Id. at 1766. 
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of the process of avoiding it.153 Nevertheless, the avoidance prin-
ciple is quite firmly embedded in the constitutional landscape. 
Several cases have indicated that agencies do have the authority 
to interpret their governing statutes to avoid constitutional prob-
lems. For example, in Bonnichsen v. U.S., Department of the Army, 
the court raised the question of whether the Army Corps of Engi-
neers could evaluate equal protection claims brought by the plain-
tiffs.154 Citing Thunder Basin, the court indicated that the agency 
could actually adjudicate the claims on the merits, but further 
stated: “Even if the agency cannot directly declare a statute un-
constitutional, there is authority that an agency may consider con-
stitutional issues in construing and applying a statute or regula-
tion.”155 In support of this principle, the district court cited the Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton 
Christian Schools, Inc.156 There, in an opinion ordering a district 
court to abstain in favor of a state agency determination of a sex 
discrimination complaint, the Court responded to an argument that 
the state agency could not hear the (religious school) employer’s 
First Amendment defenses:  
[E]ven if Ohio law is such that the [Ohio Civil 
Rights] Commission may not consider the constitu-
tionality of the statute under which it operates, it 
would seem an unusual doctrine, and one not sup-
ported by the cited case, to say that the Commission 
could not construe its own statutory mandate in the 
light of federal constitutional principles.157  
Although the case involved a state agency, not a federal one, 
there is no reason to believe that the principle is not equally appli-
cable to a federal agency.158 
                                                                                                                            
153 Id. at 1789–90. 
154 969 F. Supp. 628, 649–650 (D. Or. 1997). 
155 Id. at 651. 
156 477 U.S. 619 (1986). 
157 Id. at 629; see also Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 747 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ohio 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 629) (The court found that the Michigan agency could 
hear constitutional claims or, if not, could “narrowly construe” the statute to avoid the 
issue.). 
158 For additional discussion of the legitimacy of the use of avoidance by agencies, see 
Metzger, supra note 39, at 1916–20. 
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One example of the Supreme Court’s use of the avoidance 
principle involved both avoidance and an agency willing to address 
constitutional principles. In National Labor Relations Board v. Cath-
olic Bishop of Chicago (which was cited in Dayton Christian Schools), 
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) asserted jurisdic-
tion over Catholic schools in the context of attempts to unionize 
the lay faculty and ordered the school to bargain collectively.159 
The Board rejected claims by the schools that asserting such juris-
diction would violate the Establishment and/or Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment.160 After the Seventh Circuit re-
versed, the NLRB appealed to the Supreme Court.161 The Court 
conceded that there were constitutional claims involved, but was 
reluctant to address them: 
Although the respondents press their claims under 
the Religion Clauses, the question we consider first 
is whether Congress intended the Board to have ju-
risdiction over teachers in church-operated schools. 
In a number of cases the Court has heeded the es-
sence of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition in 
Murray v. Charming Betsy, by holding that an Act of 
Congress ought not be construed to violate the Con-
stitution if any other possible construction remains 
available. Moreover, the Court has followed this 
policy in the interpretation of the Act now before us 
and related statutes.162 
The Court proceeded to interpret the relevant statute to prec-
lude jurisdiction by the NLRB, thus avoiding the constitutional is-
sue.163 
                                                                                                                            
159 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
160 See id. at 493–95. The NLRB uses ALJs as its hearing officers, making its willingness 
to consider constitutional arguments consistent with the discussion of independence 
above. 
161 See id. at 490. 
162 Id. at 500 (citation omitted). 
163 See id. at 504–07. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan did not deny the existence 
of the avoidance principle. Id. at 508–09 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The general principle 
of construing statutes to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions is a well-settled and 
salutary one.”). Instead, he challenged the majority’s construction of the statute. Id. 
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C. The Avoidance Principle and the TTAB 
For the moment, put aside the costs and focus on some benefits 
of avoidance in the context of TTAB decision-making. If the 
TTAB is wary of declaring its own agency’s actions—or its govern-
ing statute—unconstitutional, the avoidance principle may provide 
a way to address constitutional issues without actually making such 
a declaration. Although the purpose of that mechanism is to avoid a 
constitutional decision, it almost invariably requires a court to ad-
dress the constitutional issues in order to determine whether a se-
rious constitutional question exists.164 Unlike an as-applied consti-
tutional analysis, this canon of construction provides a means for 
the TTAB to address constitutional issues without having to dec-
lare laws—or even particular agency actions—unconstitutional.165 
It can seek a construction of the Lanham Act that avoids what 
would otherwise be serious constitutional problems with the 
USPTO’s actions. Thus, for example, in recent cases such as Pro-
Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse and In re Tam, which raised free speech 
questions about the application of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act 
(barring the registration of disparaging marks), the Board could 
have determined whether cancelling one registration (Washington 
Redskins) or denying another (Slants, by an Asian-American band) 
would raise serious free speech problems based on precedents from 
the Supreme Court and lower courts.166 If the Board felt that grant-
ing relief or denying registration would create constitutional prob-
lems, it could seek an interpretation of “disparaging” that would 
obviate the problem. 
The avoidance principle, with all of its faults, can be applied in 
a somewhat straightforward manner by a court. But the TTAB is 
not a court—it is a quasi-judicial arm of an administrative agency. 
Scholars have pondered issues relating to the application of consti-
tutional avoidance in the agency context, although normally with-
                                                                                                                            
164 See, e.g., Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme 
Court’s Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16–
17 (1996). 
165 Id. at 11. 
166 In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 571 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 
S. Ct. 30 (2016); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 477 (E.D. Va. 
2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). 
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out directly addressing how an agency might apply the doctrine. 
Some of that scholarship discusses the interaction between the 
avoidance principle and the doctrine established in Chevron USA, 
Inc. v. National Resource Defense Council, which mandates deference 
to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute 
(or a statute that delegates interpretation to an agency).167 Courts 
and commentators have debated whether avoidance mandates that 
a court override the agency’s interpretation when it raises a consti-
tutional question (i.e., even if the agency’s statutory interpretation 
is not definitively unconstitutional; the fact that it raises a serious 
constitutional question may trigger avoidance).168 Some have ar-
gued that Chevron deference should prevail over avoidance, subject 
to a definitive constitutional ruling on the agency’s action.169 
But those arguments do not capture the context of a TTAB 
proceeding. The TTAB is not operating as a rule maker in the 
usual administrative manner. The Board does not engage in note-
and-comment rulemaking, which includes the possible influence of 
the political process on the decision.170 Rather, it adjudicates indi-
vidual cases mostly using the same rules of procedure and evidence 
that would be used in a court. The “rules” that the Board creates 
are its precedential opinions, setting forth its interpretations of ap-
plicable law in the registration context.171 There is little direct ac-
countability in the political sense; as noted earlier, most of the 
members of the TTAB are appointed as trademark judges, not gen-
eral policy makers.172 Although TTAB decisions are afforded a cer-
                                                                                                                            
167 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
168 See generally Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of 
Administrative Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 
ADMIN. L. REV. 139 (2012). 
169 Id. 
170 Such political influence may seem positive to those who view Chevron as reinforcing 
political accountability. See id. at 149–50 (discussing accountability and Chevron); see also 
id. at 177–79 (discussing separation of powers issues and Chevron). 
171 See TBMP § 101.03 (Jan. 2017); id. § 1203.02(f).The TTAB issues both precedential 
and non-precedential decisions. Precedential decisions are viewed as binding; non-
precedential decisions, while citable, are not binding on the Board. § 101.03 
172 See 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (2012). The TTAB includes political policy makers such as the 
Director and Deputy Director of the USPTO, the Commissioner for Patents, and the 
Commissioner for Trademarks. Of course, as employees of the USPTO (and the 
Commerce Department), trademark judges may feel some obligation to adhere to the 
custom of the TTAB and the USPTO in refusing to address constitutional issues (and in 
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tain amount of factual deference if they are appealed to the Federal 
Circuit,173 aggrieved parties are entitled to a de novo review in a 
district court if they so choose.174 
Moreover, the availability of de novo review may suggest cau-
tion in applying Chevron deference to the TTAB, especially if it 
uses the avoidance principle to interpret the statute.175 The fact 
that the Lanham Act emerged out of the common law of trade-
marks, and that it clearly contemplates courts as the primary en-
forcers (and, probably, interpreters) of the statute, similarly—or 
perhaps more strongly—counsels caution in making the TTAB the 
last word in the interpretation of a statute.176 
D. The TTAB’s Constitutional Choices 
1. Boldly Going Where the TTAB Has Not Gone Before: 
Making a Constitutional Decision 
The Thunder Basin opinion shows that the TTAB does possess 
the authority to address constitutional issues.177 Thus, its refusal to 
address those issues represents more of a policy choice than a mat-
ter of authority.178 As a policy matter, the TTAB’s choice is a ques-
tionable one. The members of the Board do not lack the expertise 
                                                                                                                            
other decisions as well). It would be naïve to assume that non-trademark judges exert no 
influence over policy. Moreover, when the TTAB issues a precedential decision, it is 
engaged in a form of statutory interpretation that may be entitled to deference. See, e.g., 
Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 634–39 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron to TTAB 
proceedings). 
173 The Federal Circuit applies a “substantial evidence” review of TTAB factual 
decisions. See, e.g., In re Inca Textiles, LLC, 344 F. App’x 603 (Fed Cir. 2009); On-Line 
Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Under this 
standard, the TTAB’s decision is upheld if “a reasonable person might find that the 
evidentiary record supports the agency’s conclusion.” Id. 
174 See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (2012); CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 
674–75 (7th Cir. 2001). 
175 CAE, Inc., 267 F.3d at 674–75. 
176 Where the statutory provisions uniquely deal with the technicalities of registration 
such caution would be less justified. Cf. Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and 
Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 149 (2016) (arguing that the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board, or PTAB, should be given deference as to interpretations of patent law). 
177 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994); see also supra notes 50–
55 and accompanying text. 
178 Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215; see also supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
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to address these issues.179 They are lawyers, experts in trademark 
law, and presumably familiar with the constitutional issues that 
frequently arise in the trademark arena.180 Although the TTAB’s 
jurisdiction is limited to trademark registrations, the Supreme 
Court clearly views the Board as possessing authority somewhat 
like a federal court,181 even when its decisions are not reviewed by 
an Article III court.182 Given the Board’s authority and expertise in 
trademark matters, there are several good reasons for why it should 
decide relevant constitutional issues.183 First, it may streamline liti-
                                                                                                                            
179 Hope Hamilton, Note, Parsing the Standard of Review Puzzle: How Much Deference 
Should Federal District Courts Afford Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Decisions?, 12 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 489, 514 (2003). 
180 TBMP § 102.03 (Jan. 2017); John L. Welch, Current Roster of TTAB Administrative 
Trademark Judges, TTABLOG (Oct. 14, 2015), http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2015/10/ 
current-roster-of-ttab-administrative.html [https://perma.cc/9Y6M-GDPZ]. 
181 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Ind., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015) (“Opposition 
proceedings before the TTAB are in many ways ‘similar to a civil action in a federal 
district court.’” (quoting TBMP § 102.03)). 
182 Id. at 1305 (noting that a failure to appeal TTAB decisions does not deprive them of 
preclusive effect). 
183 Technically, the analysis set forth here could apply to trademark examiners as well as 
trademark judges. Examiners are government officials, charged with making decisions 
about registrations. However, requiring examiners to consider constitutional arguments 
(unless directed to do so by the courts) presents problems. Examiners need to act with 
reasonable speed and there are hundreds of thousands of trademark applications each 
year. See Data Visualization Center, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/trademarks/main.dashxml [https://perma.cc/8998-
UJRM] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (showing over 500,000 filed in fiscal year 2015). 
Applications made pursuant to the Madrid Protocol must obtain a USPTO ruling within 
eighteen months of the time that the applicant requests registration (technically an 
“extension of protection”), or else the request will be automatically granted. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1141h (2012) (stating that the USPTO Director must notify the International 
Bureau within eighteen months of refusal, filing of opposition, or possibility of filing 
opposition); id. § 1141i (stating that extension of protection must be issued unless refusal 
is made pursuant to section 1141h). Thus, a prompt review of applications is very 
important. Forcing examiners to respond to constitutional arguments could encourage 
many constitutional claims, slowing the examination process. Given the number of 
applicants and the number of examiners, this also could lead to uneven application of the 
law. It makes more sense to consolidate authority to hear constitutional claims in the 
TTAB, where there is a greater likelihood of consistency (and the TTAB uses panels of at 
least three judges). Given the Supreme Court’s implication that agencies have a certain 
amount of discretion about addressing constitutional arguments, limiting an applicant’s 
ability to raise constitutional concerns to the TTAB level should not violate due process. 
The government’s interest in effective management of trademark applications, combined 
with the applicant’s ability to raise the issue within the agency process before the Board, 
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gation.184 In a case like In re Tam, if the TTAB had allowed regis-
tration (or, more precisely, publication for opposition) the burden 
would be on someone else to come forward, claim harm, file an op-
position, and be willing to take the case to the next level, if neces-
sary.185 If no opposition was filed, the case would end there.186 Even 
if an opposition had been filed, the opposition proceeding would 
give the TTAB the opportunity to revisit its ruling based on a more 
complete record.187 
This latter observation leads to a second policy favoring TTAB 
decision-making: creating a proper record.188 The Supreme Court  
has noted (albeit outside of the trademark field) the potential im-
portance of a factual record in a lower court in deciding constitu-
tional issues.189 Having the TTAB decide constitutional questions 
in the first instance permits parties to make a complete factual 
record before they have to make a decision to appeal.190 Moreover, 
in the absence of TTAB decision-making, where a factual record is 
important to resolving the constitutional issue,191 it virtually forces 
a party into a de novo appeal to a district court, where additional 
evidence can be presented, rather than to the Federal Circuit, 
which decides on the record before the TTAB.192 In an ex parte 
proceeding such as those in the Tam or Brunetti cases, an appellant 
                                                                                                                            
should outweigh the applicant’s interest in having examiners weigh the issue. This does 
not mean that examiners should not be sensitive to constitutional issues in the registration 
process, but they need not formally incorporate it into the examination process. The 
USPTO would seem to have ample authority to issue rules governing such matters. 
184 See generally In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. 
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016); see also Note, supra note 39, at 1687. 
185 See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2012). 
186 Id. 
187 In the examination process, only the applicant would introduce evidence. In an 
opposition proceeding, the opposing party may also introduce evidence. See TBMP 
§ 102.03 (Jan. 2017) (describing the different proceedings held before the TTAB); id. 
§ 1208 (discussing treatment of evidence in ex parte appeals to the TTAB). 
188 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016). 
189 Id. 
190 See Bonnichsen v. U.S., Dep’t of Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 651 (D. Or. 1997) (The 
court directed the plaintiffs on remand to agency to “make any record below that is 
needed to support [the constitutional claims],” stating that “this procedure will help to 
simplify this case . . . by creating a single record for review instead of making a second 
record in this court.”). 
191 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310. 
192 Hamilton, supra note 179, at 492–98. 
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faces a significant penalty for choosing a de novo review, even if he 
or she wins.193 This may chill the pursuit of constitutional issues by 
some litigants who need to make a factual record.194 
In the Brunetti case, which dealt with the bar to registering 
scandalous and immoral marks, the Board offered another rationale 
for refusing to hear constitutional issues: the need to “[reevaluate] 
the impacts of any evolving First Amendment jurisprudence within 
Article III courts upon determinations under section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act.”195 This reason does not stand up to scrutiny. The 
Lanham Act has many provisions directly relating to registration—
i.e., provisions that the TTAB must interpret and apply—that are 
subject to continuing interpretation by Article III courts.196 For ex-
ample, the line between “descriptive” marks and inherently dis-
tinctive marks is surely one that courts could reevaluate if they so 
choose. The Federal Circuit has already reevaluated the line be-
tween “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive” and 
primarily geographically misdescriptive.197 The Federal Circuit has 
overturned TTAB precedent on the issue of what constitutes fraud 
on the USPTO (which cancels registrations ab initio—that is, from 
their inception).198 The doctrine of functionality, which bars the 
registration of certain marks, has undergone significant doctrinal 
reevaluation, forcing the TTAB to accommodate a new and uncer-
tain legal terrain.199 Adapting to doctrinal changes in constitutional 
interpretation should pose no special difficulty for the Board. 
                                                                                                                            
193 See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (2012) (stating that de novo appellant in a non-opposition 
proceeding must pay the costs and attorney’s fees of the USPTO, even if the appeal is 
successful); Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 221 (4th Cir. 2015) (affirming decision 
of court below to impose all expenses on plaintiff in ex parte proceeding regardless of 
whether plaintiff won or lost), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016). 
194 See generally Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221. 
195 Brunetti, No. 85310960, 2014 WL 3976439, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2014). 
196 See generally Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141(n) (2012). 
197 In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
198 In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1244–46 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
199 See, e.g., In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing 
the effect of more recent Supreme Court cases on the doctrine). 
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The TTAB’s decision to address constitutional issues need not 
put the Board on a collision course with Congress.200 As discussed 
earlier, agencies occasionally have decided issues fundamental to 
their governing structure, but more often their constitutional dis-
cussions occur in a specific factual context.201 Although the TTAB 
has previously rejected a distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges,202 such a distinction makes sense from the perspective 
of agency authority. A full record—which may be more pertinent 
to as-applied challenges—would enhance and streamline constitu-
tional decision-making, both at the TTAB and appellate levels. An 
as-applied challenge leaves open the issue of the general unconsti-
tutionality of the statute.203 
If the TTAB makes a distinction between those cases requiring 
a declaration that the law is unconstitutional generally, and those 
only requiring a finding that the law as applied in a particular case 
would be unconstitutional, the Board could address the constitu-
tional issues in the latter directly. In such cases (which would in-
clude Tam and Blackhorse), the TTAB need not be concerned with 
whether a provision of the Lanham Act is constitutional on its face. 
In the case of section 2(a), all that would be required is a recogni-
tion that some disparaging marks are protected by free speech prin-
ciples, while others are not.204 
                                                                                                                            
200 Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75,837, Investment Advisors 
Release No. 4,190, Investment Company Release No. 31,806, 112 SEC Docket 6 (Sept. 3, 
2015), petition denied, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, vacated, 2017 WL 
631744 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). 
201 Id. 
202 See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1710 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 
284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
203 It is, of course, possible that an appellate court would choose to make a facial ruling, 
as done in Tam. But the appellate court still could benefit from a full record. 
204 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. 
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). After the Federal Circuit’s decision declaring section 2(a) 
unconstitutional on its face with regard to disparaging marks, the more salient issue may 
be scandalousness, as discussed in a hypothetical below. But see Letter Brief, supra note 
14, at 1 (asserting that Tam’s reasoning applies equally to scandalous and immoral marks). 
Still, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Tam will not be the final word on the matter, 
considering the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in the case. Blackhorse will be 
reviewed by the Fourth Circuit, not the Federal Circuit. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. 
Blackhorse, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). The Supreme Court denied Pro-
Football’s request for certiorari before the Fourth Circuit could hear its appeal. Pro-
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As-applied challenges are not, unfortunately, a panacea. One 
problem with this approach is that it forces the TTAB to distin-
guish between those disparaging or scandalous marks that are free-
speech-worthy from those that are not. Because this may depend 
on the context of the actual use of the mark, the TTAB may not be 
in a good position to evaluate the issue as it is often adjudicated 
prior to actual use (and it must assume that all possible uses within 
the parameters of the application for registration are relevant). Un-
less the Federal Circuit gives good guidance to the TTAB, this may 
prove to be a difficult task. 
The Federal Circuit might even force the issue upon the 
TTAB. The Board feels bound “to a large extent” by decisions of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.205 But suppose the 
Federal Circuit—say, in deciding In re Tam (the attempt to register 
Slants)—had decided that, although an application that is the sub-
ject of the TTAB’s refusal is arguably within the realm of dispa-
ragement under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, if applied in this 
context refusal to register would be unconstitutional. This man-
dates that the USPTO allow registration. That direction, presuma-
bly, binds the TTAB.206 However, how does the TTAB decide the 
next case? Does the TTAB ignore the constitutional issues again 
and force an appeal to the Federal Circuit? That seems wasteful. 
And rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure admonishes 
courts “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding.”207 Granted, the TTAB could take 
the position that administrative necessity commands it to ignore 
rule 1. But that hardly seems a sensible course of action. It would 
have a chilling effect on any potential registrant who lacks the re-
sources to litigate the case vigorously through both an opposition 
proceeding (or an appeal to the TTAB from an examiner’s denial) 
                                                                                                                            
Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 137 S. Ct. 44 (2016) (mem.). One might also distinguish Tam 
from Blackhorse on the ground that the proposed use in Tam more directly implicates 
advocacy of a free speech principle—the band is trying to delegitimize Slant as a 
disparaging term for people of Asian descent. 
205 TBMP § 101.03 (Jan. 2017). 
206 Technically, it is only formally binding in that case. However, as precedent, the 
principle of the case would be binding in future cases. See id. 
207 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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and an appeal to the Federal Circuit.208 But then, suppose that the 
Federal Circuit directs the TTAB to consider the constitutional is-
sues in individual registration cases. Would the TTAB simply 
refuse to accede to that direction? Does the Lanham Act delegate 
authority to the Board or the USPTO Director to decide to ignore 
such direction by the Federal Circuit? And, if so, does Chevron de-
ference apply to such decisions?209 These are not all easy questions. 
But at least they reach the heart of the issue—that the matter of 
constitutionality is not one of authority, but of policy. If the 
USPTO is going to avoid such issues on policy grounds, it would be 
best advised to articulate those grounds and issue proper guidance 
to the TTAB. 
2. The Softer Approach: Avoidance and the TTAB 
Assuming that the TTAB agrees to decide constitutional is-
sues, but the Board is concerned about its authority to declare laws 
unconstitutional, or is concerned about its ability to make the ne-
cessary constitutional distinctions, how should the Board pro-
ceed?210 
                                                                                                                            
208 A trial de novo in the district court may appear even more daunting in light of the 
USPTO’s apparent determination to force ex parte litigants who choose that option to 
pay the USPTO’s expenses, including attorney’s fees. These expenses would be imposed 
if an applicant chooses a de novo appeal from a denial of registration not resulting from an 
opposition—i.e., the TTAB upholds the examiner’s denial—which was the situation in 
Tam, and the fees and expenses are not waived even if the private litigant wins. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (2012); see also Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(upholding the requirement that even a successful applicant must pay the USPTO’s 
expenses), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016). The requirement to pay expenses only 
applies to appeals de novo to a district court, not direct appeals to the Federal Circuit. 
209 As to this, presumably not. The Federal Circuit would probably take the position 
that such an interpretation of the Board’s authority was unreasonable, making Chevron 
deference unnecessary. On the other hand, following the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Tam, the USPTO issued an examination guide, suspending applications that would be 
refused on the grounds that the mark is disparaging, immoral, or scandalous. (The 
suspension will be lifted once the Supreme Court decides the case.) U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., EXAMINATION GUIDE 01-16 (Mar. 2016) (on file with the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). Moreover, the availability of 
de novo review may countenance caution about applying Chevron deference to the TTAB, 
especially if it uses the avoidance. 
210 Note that it may be preferable to have the Board decide all issues, at least 
preliminarily, even if it lacks authority to declare laws unconstitutional. 
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One approach is for the TTAB to use a variant of the avoidance 
principle. As an arm of an agency, the TTAB theoretically is not 
subject to some of the counter-majoritarian restraints that have 
been used to support the avoidance principle.211 On the other hand, 
as a quasi-judicial body, the Board does not necessarily reflect the 
political agenda of the incumbent administration.212 Thus, the re-
straints of avoidance may be appropriate. Indeed, even if one be-
lieves that the avoidance principle should not be followed by 
courts, one might endorse a form of it at the TTAB. If an agency 
tribunal is without power to declare a law unconstitutional, then it 
cannot always decide the constitutional question. However, as a 
governmental body, it is bound by the Constitution. The avoidance 
principle allows it to address the issue without technically resolving 
it. 
The application of avoidance in the TTAB can operate as a rule 
of doubt or presumption of registrability. When a refusal to register 
would raise a serious constitutional question, the Board should only 
reject the application (at least on the grounds that raise the ques-
tion) if it is very certain that the refusal is constitutional. 
In the context of ex parte appeals, that approach would reduce 
the need for appeals to the Federal Circuit by allowing the registra-
tion to issue. This would not preclude the courts from hearing the 
issue. Anyone who may be harmed by the registration can bring a 
cancellation proceeding.213 As the Blackhorse case illustrates, apart 
from laches considerations, there is no time limit for cancellation 
under section 2(a).214 Alternatively, an aggrieved person may bring 
an opposition prior to registration.215 Although the TTAB is unlike-
ly to alter its view of the case in the second proceeding, it is possi-
                                                                                                                            
211 See Schauer, supra note 147, at 91–92. 
212 Eleven of the current trademark judges were appointed before President Obama took 
office in January 2009. Three of those judges were appointed before 2000. John L. Welch, 
Current Roster of TTAB Judges, TTABLOG (Oct. 3, 2016), http://thettablog.blogspot.com 
/2016/10/current-roster-of-ttab-judges.html [https://perma.cc/ZM4B-HCDV]. As 
noted earlier, the TTAB also includes the Director and the Deputy Director of the 
USPTO, as well as the Commissioner of Patents and the Commissioner of Trademarks. 
See supra note 124. 
213 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012). 
214 § 1064(3). For some grounds, there is a statutory five-year time limit. Id. 
215 Id. § 1063(a). 
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ble to appeal that decision to an Article III court, which can defini-
tively resolve any constitutional questions. 
The Catholic Bishop case, discussed above, provides an example 
of how an agency could avoid a constitutional declaration. In 
Catholic Bishop, the NLRB could have chosen an interpretation of 
its statutory authority that precluded jurisdiction, in light of the 
constitutional issues that asserting jurisdiction would raise.216 It 
would then be left to a reviewing Article III court to determine the 
correctness of the NLRB’s interpretation and, if necessary, resolve 
the constitutional issues raised by a contrary interpretation of the 
NLRB’s jurisdiction.217 
Consider how the TTAB might apply this technique in the fu-
ture. One likely area of use is the application of section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act to “scandalous” marks.218 The Federal Circuit in the 
Tam case held that section 2(a) was unconstitutional on its face with 
respect to disparaging marks—that is, section 2(a) could not consti-
tutionally bar the registration of any mark deemed disparaging. 219 
The Federal Circuit will not have the last word on this issue,220 but 
the TTAB has said that it looks to the Federal Circuit for its guid-
ing precedent (at least in the absence of Supreme Court 
precedent).221 But In re Tam specifically limited its holding to dis-
paraging marks and did not address the scandalousness bar.222 For 
the sake of argument, assume that the scandalousness bar could be 
                                                                                                                            
216 See generally NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
217 This, of course, assumes that the constitutional issue would supersede any Chevron 
deference to which the NLRB’s interpretation of its jurisdiction would be entitled. See 
Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 712–13 
(2007). A detailed examination of the intersection of Chevron and avoidance is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
218 Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
219 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. 
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). Although the Federal Circuit did not use the words “on its 
face,” its opinion made clear that it intended to strike down section 2(a) completely, not 
just as it applied to the case at bar. See id. 
220 Obviously, the grant of certiorari gives the Supreme Court the last word; whether 
the Fourth Circuit will address the issue in the appeal of Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse 
prior to the Supreme Court is uncertain. 
221 See generally Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F.Supp.2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
222 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358. 
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applied in some cases.223 The most notable cases would involve 
marks that are legally obscene.224 Obscenity does not merit First 
Amendment protection.225 However, marks that are merely offen-
sive or indecent merit some First Amendment protection. On the 
other hand, even offensive marks are subject to some regulation, as 
is evident from broadcasting jurisprudence.226 A challenge to a re-
fusal to register a scandalous mark presents the TTAB with several 
choices. The boldest position would be to declare the scandalous 
bar unconstitutionally vague.227 However, this possibility, dis-
cussed above, is an unlikely choice for the TTAB. Although other 
agencies have taken equally bold steps, it does not appear that they 
are required to do so. The TTAB is likely to seek a solution that 
requires the least possible constitutional intervention, and this 
represents the greatest degree of intervention. Even after In re Tam, 
one could imagine that the TTAB could reiterate its position so 
that it would not address constitutional issues at all.228 However, In 
                                                                                                                            
223 The USPTO has effectively conceded that it cannot be applied constitutionally in 
light of Tam, having stated in a letter brief that the reasoning of In re Tam applies equally 
to scandalous marks as to disparaging marks. Letter Brief, supra note 14, at 2–4. 
224 Marks to be used on illegal goods or services would be refused registration by the 
USPTO on the ground that they are not in lawful use in commerce. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.69 
(2016); TMEP § 907 (Jan. 2017). It also appears that the USPTO would refuse to register 
marks that independently violate federal law, apart from any section 2(a) issues. See 
TMEP § 907. That could be the case with legally obscene marks as well. 
225 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973). One could argue that the government 
has no legitimate interest in barring trademark registration even of obscene marks, given 
that obscene works are eligible for copyright protection. But it is not necessary to address 
that argument now. 
226 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747–51 (1978) (finding indecent, but not 
obscene, monologue could be barred from broadcast under the circumstances of the 
case); cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012) (The Court 
concluded that the FCC violated due process rights of broadcaster by not giving fair 
notice that “fleeting expletives” could be deemed indecent, but the Court did not rule on 
the constitutionality of such a bar.). 
227 Unlike disparaging marks, which target a specific person or group, and are thus 
susceptible to viewpoint discrimination, scandalous marks may offend a large, but 
nonspecific, group of the population. See Emily S. Kustina, Comment, Discriminatory 
Discretion: USPTO Procedures and Viewpoint Discrimination Under Section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 547–49 (2016). 
228 Cf. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Pitts, 115 U.S.P.Q.2d 1099 (T.T.A.B. 2015) 
(refusing to vacate opinion when parties stipulated to vacate as part of settlement), rev’d 
sub nom. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Houndstooth Mafia Enters., 163 F. Supp. 3d 
1150 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2016) (ordering TTAB to vacate prior decision in order to 
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re Tam makes that position improvident. It is clear that the TTAB 
cannot—consistent with In re Tam—maintain that the First 
Amendment does not apply to trademark registrations. Ignoring 
the constitutional issue altogether virtually mandates an appeal in 
any case where the Board upholds a refusal to register a scandalous 
mark (including any case where registration of a scandalous mark is 
opposed and the opposition is sustained). That is wasteful. Thus, it 
makes sense to find a way to deal with the issue at the Board level 
to avoid the unnecessarily imposition on the Federal Circuit’s 
docket. A reasonable approach would be to recognize a distinction 
between as-applied and facial constitutional challenges, addressing 
the former but not the latter.229 In that situation, the Board would 
address the constitutional challenge directly. There is no apparent 
impediment to the TTAB adopting this approach. It is straightfor-
ward and it has the advantage of clearly presenting the legal issues 
in the event of an appeal. If the TTAB has used an erroneous legal 
standard, the Federal Circuit (or another reviewing court, if a party 
elects to appeal to a district court) can clarify the standard, making 
it less likely that future appeals will be necessary. Once one accepts 
that First Amendment challenges (or challenges under other con-
stitutional provisions, such as the Commerce Clause) are appropri-
ate in trademark registration proceedings, this is the most logical 
approach. Thus, even after In re Tam, the scandalous mark provi-
sion may be susceptible to an as-applied challenge, which takes into 
account the context of the use. 
However, as discussed above, the TTAB may be more averse 
to making constitutional decisions than agencies that use ALJs as 
adjudicators. If so, the Board could review rulings on scandalous 
marks with an eye toward avoiding a constitutional decision.230 
                                                                                                                            
complete the settlement agreed to by the parties). The TTAB subsequently acceded to 
the court’s order, but specifically reserved the right to appeal. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of 
Ala. v. Pitts, Opp. No. 91187103 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2016) (not precedential). 
229 As discussed earlier, the TTAB so far has refused to recognize this distinction. See 
supra Section III.A. 
230 In the wake of In re Tam, the USPTO issued a new examination guide that suspends 
all trademark applications where the examiner finds the mark to be disparaging, 
scandalous, or immoral until such time as the Federal Circuit issues its decision in 
Brunetti (this applies to scandalous or immoral refusals), or the decision in Tam becomes 
final and non-appealable, either by passage of time or by Supreme Court decision in the 
case. See EXAMINATION GUIDE 01-16, supra note 209. Thus, the USPTO is effectively 
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That review could come in different forms. The most drastic would 
be to interpret “scandalous” as applying only to those marks clear-
ly outside of First Amendment protection, which might not be ac-
ceptable to the Federal Circuit as the proper legal standard.231 A 
less drastic approach would ask whether the refusal to register the 
mark in question would raise serious constitutional questions (es-
pecially in light of In re Tam). If it does, then the TTAB should al-
low the mark to be registered. An interesting example of how this 
might work is the Board’s decision in the case In re Luxuria, where 
the applicant sought to register a bottle shaped like a raised middle 
finger as a trademark.232 This application involved more than a 
simple word trademark; it was about a product configuration as a 
mark. Thus, the decision implicated the product as well as the 
mark. The product clearly had communicative value. It is reasona-
ble to assume that the mark was denied registration because of its 
message. That arguably raises a serious constitutional question un-
der In re Tam over whether the USPTO was engaging in viewpoint 
discrimination. Absent a compelling governmental interest, which 
would be very difficult to show, such an action would be unconsti-
tutional. Under that analysis, the Board’s decision should have 
gone the other way, and a registration should have been allowed in 
order to avoid a constitutional question about the scope of the 
scandalousness bar. 
                                                                                                                            
removing itself from making any decisions regarding the constitutionality of applications 
under the scandalous, immoral, or disparaging provisions of section 2(a). 
231 As discussed above, one might argue that the Chevron doctrine would require 
deference to the TTAB’s interpretation. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 
634–36 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron to TTAB proceedings). The term scandalous is 
arguably ambiguous, which would satisfy the first part of the test. But the Federal Circuit 
could find the limited interpretation to be unreasonable, especially in view of the many 
TTAB opinions taking a more expansive view of the term. See, e.g., In re Bose, 580 F.3d 
1240, 1243–45 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reviewing the TTAB’s legal standard de novo and 
deciding that the TTAB applied an incorrect standard as to fraud on the USPTO); see also 
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 577 (1988) (concluding that Chevron deference is not applicable where agency’s 
construction raises serious constitutional questions and other interpretations not raising 
those questions are available); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, No. 99–1385 (CKK), 2000 WL 
1923326, at *1, *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2000) (specifically applying de novo standard instead 
of Chevron deference). 
232 Luxuria, s.r.o., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1146 (T.T.A.B. 2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
The TTAB’s history of refusing to entertain constitutional ar-
guments is premised on a flawed assumption of lack of authority. 
Not only do other agencies and executive departments address 
constitutional arguments, the Supreme Court, in the Thunder Basin 
decision,233 has undercut the authority rationale for the TTAB’s 
inaction. At most, the Board’s refusal to address those issues 
should be seen as a policy decision. But this policy is unwise. First, 
if In re Tam is upheld,234 it will be difficult to argue that trademark 
registration decisions are immune from constitutional attack. Thus, 
a continued failure to address the issues forces applicants (and re-
gistrants in cancellation proceedings) to appeal to courts to raise 
their constitutional issues. This is a poor way to funnel the issues. 
Although Tam struck down the disparagement bar to registration 
on its face,235 future cases may recognize as-applied challenges to 
registration. Such issues—as well as many facial challenges—are 
best addressed with a proper factual record. Because the Federal 
Circuit decides appeals on the basis of the TTAB record, litigants 
will be forced to appeal to a district court to make a record, which, 
in some cases, will force them to pay the USPTO’s expenses. 
Putting a penalty on constitutional decision-making is not only un-
wise; it may be a denial of due process. Although the Board may be 
wary of wading into the vagaries of constitutional law, trademark 
law is replete with changing doctrine and the Board should not let 
that be a roadblock to effective decision-making. To the extent that 
the TTAB wishes to avoid constitutional issues even in the face of 
these reasons, it should at least use the avoidance principle to de-
termine whether an applicant or registrant has raised a serious con-
stitutional issue, and attempt to interpret the statute in a manner 
designed to avoid the issue. Although these choices raise a number 
of non-trivial issues—the Chevron doctrine being only one—as 
government officers, the members of the TTAB should no longer 
avoid their obligation to uphold the Constitution in their decision-
making processes. 
                                                                                                                            
233 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 202 (1994). 
234 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 
S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
235 Id. at 1336 
